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Jesse Baker
Utah State University

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of immigration policy on financial markets. I
estimate the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding two events: the effective start date
of the Immigration Act of 1990 and the implementation of the Temporary Protected
Status (TPS) of Nicaragua and Honduras in 1999. Focusing on agriculture, construction,
and manufacturing firms, I find that the CARs surrounding the events are indeed positive
and significant, suggesting that the market anticipated growth among industries that are
likely to hire Central American immigrants.

Introduction
Since the election of President Trump, immigration policy has become an
increasingly central topic in the United States. This debate reached a new high when
differences of opinion among policy makers encouraged President Trump to declare a
national emergency in order to build a wall across the United States/Mexican border.
Although the debate surrounding immigration policy is strong now, immigration has been
an ongoing topic in the United States for hundreds of years. Building a wall between the
United States and Mexico would not be the first time policy makers have attempted to
restrict the flow of immigrants into the country. On May 6, 1882, a federal law called the
Chinese Exclusion Act was signed, which excluded the immigration of all Chinese
laborers. Immigrants have been a long standing issue in the U.S. as natives fear what the
increased competition in the labor force means for them.

There has been significant research dedicated to answering the question of
whether immigrants help, or hurt the economy. Often times, there is evidence on both
sides of the argument, suggesting that the truth lie somewhere in the middle. One
interesting study was focused on the Mariel Boat-lift Crisis, which was a naturally
occurring economic phenomenon in which about 125,000 Cubans migrated to Florida.
Economist, David Card studied the impact of the Mariel immigrants and found that there
was virtually no impact on the wages, or unemployment rates of unskilled workers (Card
(1990)). However, further research conducted by George Borjas suggested that the Mariel
immigrants caused a 10% to 30% decrease in wages among high school dropouts in
Miami (Borjas (2017)). Immigration expert Giovanni Peri later analyzed the effect of the
Mariel immigrants using synthetic control and determined that there was no significant
difference in wages for Miami workers (Peri and Yasenov (2018)). Indeed, Geoffrey
Keeton expressed in the same paper when explaining immigrant migration flows that they
increased labor imbalance in some areas, while reducing them in others (Keeton and
Newton (2005)).
As shown above, when looking at immigration over time, it is sometimes difficult
to determine exactly it effects the economy. The purpose of this paper is to help shed
more light on what impact immigration has on the economy. Using event studies
surrounding the Immigration Act of 1990 and Temporary Protected Status of Honduras
and Nicaragua in 1999, I monitor stock prices of agricultural, construction, and
manufacturing firms. Results show that indeed cumulative abnormal returns are positive
and significant for various time windows surrounding these events. For the Immigration
Act of 1990, three-day CARs are approximately 0.0083 suggesting that, relative to the

market, treated firms (agriculture, construction, and manufacturing) increased about
0.83% during the three-day period surrounding the signing of the Immigration Act. When
examining the 1999 TPS order, three-day CARs are approximately 0.0213 suggesting
that, relative to the market, treated firms increased about 2.13%. These results are
noteworthy, as it shows the immediate unbiased reaction of the market in response to
what can be perceived as an increase in immigrant labor. Positive abnormal returns
suggest that agricultural, construction, and manufacturing companies would benefit from
permitting immigrants to work in the United States legally.
Additionally, I use regression analysis to estimate what forces may be driving the
CARs to be positive. The OLS models attempt to determine which, if any of the treated
firm types drive the positive and significant CARs. For the immigration act of 1990,
construction and manufacturing have positive coefficients of 0.0529 and 0.0147, with
construction being slightly significant and manufacturing being insignificant. However,
with the 1999 TPS order, construction and manufacturing had coefficients of -0.0240 and
0.0330. Construction being insignificant and manufacturing being slightly significant.
These results seem to suggest that, if anything, manufacturing firms are driving the
unusually large CARs during the periods surrounding these immigration events.

Immigration Act of 1990 and Temporary Protected Status
On November 29, 1990, the Immigration Act was signed by George H. W. Bush.
The new bill increased the number of visas granted to immigrants from 530,000 per year,
to 700,000 per year from 1992-1994 and then 675,000 visas per year every year after
1994 (Leiden and Neal (1990)). The new bill effectively increased the number of visas by

over 27% per year. The Immigration Act also describes in great detail different nuances
of issuing visas, such as, family-based immigration, employment-based immigration,
“diversity” immigration, and etcetera1.
As part of the Immigration Act of 1990, Title III had a “temporary protected
status” clause. The clause grants illegal aliens to have legal residency in the United States
for up to eighteen months2. The Attorney General must first designate “temporary
protected status” to nations that are in the midst of civil conflict, natural disaster, or other
extraordinary circumstances that make the alien’s return unsafe (Leiden and Neal
(1990)). In order for aliens to qualify for TPS, they must be continually physically
present in the United States since the date of the country’s TPS designation (Leiden and
Neal (1990)).
These events are particularly interesting to this study, because they provide a
natural instance in which I can capture immediate market expectations regarding
immigration policy. Since firms that may be at a higher disposition to hire unskilled
workers would benefit from an increase in the supply of immigrant labor, it would make
sense that these policies would positively impact them.

Data
Using the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) database, I gathered
daily stock price data for all publicly traded agricultural, construction, and manufacturing
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TPS can be renewed if unsafe conditions persist (Leiden and Neal (1990)).

firms. Using the CRSP data, I calculate the CARs for each event against the CRSP valueweighted market index, which is the value-weighted mean return of all publicly traded
firms available on CRSP.
Additionally, I obtain daily information on stocks such as price, market cap,
turnover, volatility, and whether or not the company is on the New York Stock Exchange.
Price is the close stock price on the day of the event. Market Cap is the market
capitalization on the day of the event. Turnover is the ratio of daily volume (on the event
day) scaled by shares outstanding. Volatility is calculated following Alizadeh, Brandt,
and Diebold (2002) as the difference between the natural log of the daily high price and
the natural log of the daily low price. These variables are used as control variables when I
estimate my OLS model to find the driving force of the CARs.

Model
I use two different models in my analysis. The purpose of the first model is to
obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the treated firms (agriculture,
construction, and manufacturing). I estimate the cumulative abnormal returns first by
using the following time series model that spans 209 days before the event date:
Rt = α + βRm,t + εt
From the time series model, we can derive the following model:
εt = Rt - α - βRm,t

I then add up the residuals over the event window, which estimates the returns
above the stock market. I used the value weighted index from CRSP as my benchmark
which controls for firm size. If the CARs are positive, it suggests that the treated firms
outperformed the value weighted index, while negative CARs indicate underperformance compared to the value weighted index.
I estimate CAR(-10,10), CAR(-5,5), CAR(-3,3), CAR(-2,2), CAR(-1,1), and
CAR(0,1). CAR(-10,10) estimates returns ten days prior to the event and ten days after,
spanning twenty-one days total, since we include the event day at day 0. Every other
CAR’s event window uses the same approach. For example, CAR(-5,5) estimates returns
five days before the event, and five days after, spanning eleven days total. Over every
event window that I estimated, I found that all CARs for both the Immigration Act of
1990, and Temporary Protected Status of 1999 were positive.
The second model I use is a simple OLS regression that signals what forces are
driving the CARs to be positive. My dependent variables are CAR(-5,5), and CAR(-1,1),
which are cumulative abnormal returns over an 11-day and 3-day period. The main
independent variables in focus are Construction, Manufacturing, and Agriculture, which
are dummy variables that signal if the firm is part of the treated group. I also included the
following variables: ln(MktCap) to control for firm size, Price, Turnover, Volatility and
NYSE (whether or not the firm is on the New York Stock Exchange). I included these
variables to help control for other factors that could be driving the CARs.

Results
The appendix contains all of my results. Tables 1, and 2 show the summary
statistics (mean, standard deviation, 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile) for all
the variables in the sample of the Immigration Act of 1990, and Temporary Protected
Status of 1999. The summary statistics are divided into Panels A, B, and C, where Panel
A describes the summary statistics for agricultural firms, Panel B describes the summary
statistics for construction firms, and Panel C describes the summary statistics for
manufacturing firms.
Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the estimated means, medians, t-statistics and sample
size for each CAR that I estimated. Table 3 reports the estimated CARs for the average
firm surrounding the Immigration Act of 1990. It is noteworthy to point out that all CARs
have positive means. CAR(-10,10) has the highest mean of 3.12%, while CAR(-3,3) has
the lowest mean of 0.12%. All of the CARs in Table 3 are highly significant, with the
exception of CAR(-3,3). The high t-statistics, and positive CARs suggest with high
confidence that the abnormal returns are different from zero.
Table 4 is the standard event study for all firms surrounding 1999 TPS. Again, I
find that all CARs have positive means. CAR(-10,10) again has the maximum mean of
10.03%, while CAR(0,1) has the minimum mean of 0.68%. All t-statistics are highly
significant in this calculation. One explanation as to why the t-statistics are much greater
in Table 4 than in Table 3 could come from the larger sample size. Table 4 has over 600
more observations than Table 3. As the sample size increases, the variance of the
parameter estimates decreases, giving greater confidence. It is also possible that TPS is a
better event, as it occurred more suddenly than the signing of the Immigration Act.

Table 5 shows the estimated CARs by firm type for the Immigration Act of 1990.
This time, I only estimate CARs for two different even windows (CAR(-5,5), and CAR(1,1)). Notice that the sample size varies drastically depending on the firm type. There
only nineteen agricultural firms, and fifty-two construction firms. By contrast, there are a
total of 2,341 manufacturing firms. Since the sample size is small for agricultural and
construction firms, I am less likely to find significance. However, I still estimate
moderate to strong significance for construction and manufacturing firms. For the
construction firms, I estimate a mean CAR(-5,5) of 5.88%, while the manufacturing firms
mean for CAR(-5,5) is 1.86%.
Table 6 shows the resulting CARs by firm type surrounding 1999 TPS. Again,
there are few agricultural, and construction firms, making it difficult to have significance
in the t-statistics. However, CAR(-5,5) and CAR(-1,1) for manufacturing firms have
large, and statistically significant means of 9.35%, and 2.20% respectively.
In Table 7, I estimate an OLS regression using cross-sectional data to try and
determine what variables are driving the CARs surrounding the Immigration Act of 1990.
My dependent variables are CAR(-5,5), and CAR(-1,1). The independent variables of
focus are Construction, and Manufacturing. Construction and Manufacturing are dummy
variables used to estimate how firm type may impact the dependent variable. I have also
included Ln(MktCap), Price, Turnover, Volatility, and NYSE as control variables. Little
can be said about this model. While Construction and Manufacturing have positive
coefficients, they are not statistically significant. The models carry little significance as
well, with adjusted 𝑅 2 of 0.0014 and -0.0001.

In Table 8, I repeat the methodology used in Table 7. However, this time I am
using regression analysis to find what factors are driving the CARs surrounding 1999
TPS. Again, the coefficients for Construction and Manufacturing are insignificant.
Although, the OLS models to show greater significance with adjusted 𝑅 2 of 0.1190 and
0.1373.
In Figure 1, I show the CARs for both the Immigration Act of 1990 and 1999
TPS. The y-axis represents the value of the CAR, and the x-axis represents how many
days before, or after day zero i.e. the event date. Figure 1 clearly illustrates that the CARs
tend to be more positive around the event date.

Conclusion
This research adds to an already prolific field of study. While there has been
extensive research done in the scope of immigration, to my knowledge, there has never
been any research done on the impact that immigration policy has on financial markets.
The models I develop yield interesting results, but are subject to limitations.
One limitation of my analysis is the ambiguity of what impact the Immigration
Act of 1990 and 1999 TPS had on the actual economy. Intuitively, one may be able to
deduce that since agricultural, construction, and manufacturing firms benefited from
these policies, there was a spillover effect in the economy, the likes of which benefited
others. However, this is not explicitly shown in the models.
There are trading strategies that can be implemented from my findings. For
example, if you anticipate temporary protected status to be designated to countries that

are similar to Honduras, and Nicaragua, you could invest in manufacturing, or
construction companies. Based on my findings in Figure 1, an ideal time to short the
shares would be sometime within a five day window of the event. This strategy could
also cross over to other immigration related policies that would increase the supply of
laborers from Central and South American countries. However, there is still risk in this
strategy. According to my findings in the OLS regressions, firm type had an insignificant
relationship with the CARs. Additionally, when looking at Figure 1, the combined firms
from the Immigration Act of 1990 and 1999 TPS, there are several days in which the
abnormal returns are negative.
In spite of the shortcomings of the model, the CARs are positive and often
significant surrounding the Immigration Act of 1990 and 1999 TPS. Even though prices
are often random, and unpredictable, there is a potential strategy in anticipating abnormal
returns surrounding immigration policy. Market expectations, which should be unbiased
and rational, seem to believe that increasing the supply of immigrant labor, positively
impacts agricultural, construction, and manufacturing companies.
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